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Abstract 
This paper shows a sharp contrast between theoretical predictions of merger negotiations when takeover 
markup and runup are measured in dollar vs rate terms.  It argues that the empirical tests by an influential 
study cannot reject the hypothesis of a costly feedback loop as the authors claim.  Using markup and 
runup in standardized dollar terms, it provides evidence that is consistent with both hypotheses of rational 
deal anticipation and a costly feedback loop.  This exercise demonstrates the importance and necessity of 
differentiating regressions with variables in dollar terms and in rate terms to avoid drawing inaccurate or 
even false conclusions.    
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1. Introduction 
How do takeover bidders react to the market feedback on merger negotiations?  Do they have to 
pay higher takeover costs if the target stock prices experience substantial pre-offer runups?  In a 
seminal study, Schwert (1996) reports that in a large sample of takeovers, bidding firms markup 
their offers almost equal to the runups.  This finding implies that markup pricing prevails in the 
competition for corporate control (see also Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008)).  Recently, 
Betton, Eckbo, Thompson and Thorburn (2014, BETT hereafter) develop an empirically testable 
model of takeover that permits stock market feedback on takeover rumors.1  The model assumes 
that the information of takeover negotiations is leaked in the form of rumors which send a signal 
to the market of the ongoing negotiations.  An important insight generated by the model is that 
takeover rumors or signals reveal the information of “both the deal probability and the deal-
specific takeover synergies conditional on a bid.”  Rational investors use the signal “to update 
not only the takeover probability but also the conditional value” of synergies.  With this 
endogenous deal probability, the bidders have different offering strategies depending on whether 
the market is operating under rational deal anticipation or there is a costly feedback loop in the 
takeover negotiations.  The model predicts that in a linear regression of takeover markup on 
runup, the slope coefficient is greater than −1 under rational deal anticipation.  However, the 
coefficient is strictly positive if there is a costly feedback loop from takeover runup to markup.  
BETT conducts a thorough and solid empirical analysis to test the two competing hypotheses.  
                                                          
1 Research on mergers and acquisitions is extensive. For a general survey, see Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008); 
for rumors on mergers and acquisitions and their effects on pricing, see, for example, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), 
Pound and Zeckhauser (1990), and Zivney, Bertin and Torabzadeh (1996).   
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Based on the negative slope coefficients of their linear regressions, the authors claim that their 
empirical results support the hypothesis of rational deal anticipation and reject that of a costly 
feedback loop.  
This paper is concerned by the lack of connection between the theory and the empirical 
tests in BETT.  The theoretical predictions made by the takeover model are based on markup and 
runup in terms of dollar values, whereas the various empirical tests conducted by BETT use the 
rates of markup and runup.  We argue that the relationship between markup and runup in dollar 
terms is different from that between the rates of markup and runup.  To this end, we establish, 
under the BETT framework, that the slope coefficient of a linear regression of the markup rate 
against the runup rate can be negative under both the hypotheses of rational deal anticipation and 
a costly feedback loop.  Thus, in contradiction to their claim, BETT’s empirical results do not 
reject either hypothesis.   
To see the point intuitively, let us consider a numerical example.  Following BETT’s 
notation, 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 is the runup of the target firm’s value after the market receives a signal of the 
potential takeover and 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 is the market’s valuation of the target’s deal value conditional on the 
bid announcement (i.e., the takeover premium).  Both 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 and 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 are in dollar terms.  Assuming 
that the initial value of the target is 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼,
2 then the target’s market value after stock price run-up but 
just before takeover announcement is 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 and its value after takeover announcement is 
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃.  In turn, the target’s markup in dollar terms is 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 − (𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅) = 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅, and the 
rates of runup and markup can be defined by 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼  and 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 = 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃−𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 .  BETT empirically 
examines various forms of the following regression model, 
                                                          
2 It is the value before the market receives the takeover signal.  BETT normalizes it to zero in the theoretical model. 
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 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 = 𝑎𝑎� + 𝑏𝑏�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 , (1) 
and the results are reported in their Table IV.  Here we use 𝑎𝑎� = 0.36 and 𝑏𝑏� = −0.24 from model 
(1) in Table IV of BETT to generate a dataset of 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, which is illustrated in Panel A of 
Figure 1, where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is exogenous, ranging from 0 to 30%.  Since 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 =
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼(1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀, we obtain dollar-value runups and markups in Panel B that correspond to the 
rates of runups and markups in Panel A.  Figure 1 shows that although the dataset presents a 
negative correlation between the rates of runup and markup, the corresponding correlation 
between dollar-value runup and markup is actually positive.  In other words, a negative estimate 
of 𝑏𝑏� in regression (1) does not secure a negative slope 𝑏𝑏 in the regression of dollar-value markup, 
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅, against dollar-value runup, 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅; i.e.,  
 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 . (2) 
Therefore, the empirical results reported in Table IV of BETT do not contradict the hypothesis of 
rational deal anticipation, nor do they provide evidence rejecting the hypothesis of a costly 
feedback loop. 
Figure 1 here 
Figure 1 has more general implications.  Researchers often analyze price (or value) 
changes when developing theories or modeling to preserve tractability, and they analyze the rates 
of returns when empirically testing the theories to preserve the comparability in the cross-section 
(see, for example, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), Hong and Stein (1999), and Hong, Lim 
and Stein (2000)).  In some cases, this distinction has no material implications for the 
understanding of economic forces and mechanisms.  However, the negative (or positive) 
relationship implied by the linear regression of the rates of two random economic variables may 
not be retained for their dollar-value counterparts.  Therefore, further examination and validation 
[Type text] 
 
are required when the estimates from the regressions of the rates are used to test a hypothesis 
based on the predictions for the variables in their dollar terms.  A leading example in this regard 
is Banerjee (2011), who shows the difference between dollar return and the rate of return by 
theoretically analyzing the effects of dispersion in beliefs on dollar returns separately from the 
effects on the rates of return.     
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the BETT 
model and its main findings.  Section 3 presents the theoretical predictions on the relationship 
between the rates of runup and markup in the BETT framework.  Under rational deal 
anticipation, they are, to a certain extent, consistent with the predictions in Proposition 1 of 
BETT.  However, the predictions exhibit substantial differences under the hypothesis of a costly 
feedback loop.  The key finding is that under both hypotheses, the relationship between the 
markup rate and runup rate can be either positive or negative, depending on the model 
parameters.  Therefore, the sign (or the range) of the slope coefficient of linear regression (1) 
cannot test these hypotheses.   
To empirically examine the hypotheses of rational deal anticipation and a costly feedback 
loop, Section 4 proposes using standardized runup and markup to test the two hypotheses; i.e., 
both dollar-value runup and markup are scaled by the initial value of the target.  The empirical 
results indicate that the hypothesis of a costly feedback loop cannot be rejected and rational deal 
anticipation should not be considered a favored hypothesis.  This claim contradicts BETT’s 
conclusion.  The final section concludes the paper. 
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2. A Review of the BETT Model 
The market receives a rumor (takeover signal), 𝑠𝑠, after the negotiations of a takeover 
start, and the signal causes investors to anticipate a synergistic takeover.  The value of total 
synergies for the takeover is 𝑆𝑆, which is known to the bidder and target negotiators but is 
unknown to the market.  However, the market knows the distribution of 𝑆𝑆 upon the reception of 
signal 𝑠𝑠, i.e., conditional probability density function 𝑔𝑔(𝑆𝑆|𝑠𝑠) and cumulative distribution 
function 𝐺𝐺(𝑆𝑆|𝑠𝑠) are public knowledge.  The rule of synergy sharing is that the acquirer receives 
𝜃𝜃𝑆𝑆, while the target receives 𝐵𝐵(𝑆𝑆) ≡ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑆𝑆.   
The baseline takeover model assumes rational deal anticipation; that is, the takeover offer 
price does not respond to the takeover runup before the offer announcement.  As the bidder bears 
a known bidding cost 𝐶𝐶, the bid only occurs if 𝑆𝑆 > 𝐾𝐾 ≡ 𝐶𝐶 𝜃𝜃⁄ .  Therefore, the probability of the 
bid occurring can be calculated by  
𝜋𝜋 =  � 𝑔𝑔(𝑆𝑆|𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆.∞
𝐾𝐾
 
The offer premium, conditional on the offer announcement, is 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 = 𝐵𝐵� ≡ 𝐸𝐸(𝐵𝐵(𝑆𝑆)|𝑠𝑠, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑).  In 
turn, the runup in dollar terms, 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅, has the following relationship with 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃: 
𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 =  � 𝐵𝐵(𝑆𝑆)𝑔𝑔(𝑆𝑆|𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆∞
𝐾𝐾
= 𝜋𝜋𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃. 
Therefore, the markup and runup are related through  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 = 1 − 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 . (3) 
 
PROPOSITION 1 OF BETT: Suppose the markup projection (3) holds.  When the takeover 
signal causes the market to infer different takeover probabilities and conditional deal values 
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across a sample of takeovers (𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 > 0⁄  and 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 > 0⁄ ), then the linear regression (2) 
produces a slope coefficient 𝑏𝑏 that is strictly greater than −1. 
 
The costly feedback loop implies that there is a runup transfer 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ to the target in addition 
to the announcement surprise 𝐵𝐵�∗ ≡ 𝐸𝐸∗(𝐵𝐵(𝑆𝑆)|𝑠𝑠, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑).  Therefore, the takeover premium has two 
components: 
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃
∗ = 𝐵𝐵�∗ + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗. 
The superscript * indicates values and expectations computed using the new bid threshold 
𝐾𝐾∗ = (𝐶𝐶 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗)/𝜃𝜃.  Due to the increased bid threshold, the probability of the bid occurring now 
becomes  
𝜋𝜋∗ =  � 𝑔𝑔(𝑆𝑆|𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆∞
𝐾𝐾∗
. 
With this probability, we still have 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ = 𝜋𝜋∗𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃∗ and 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃
∗ − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗ = 𝐵𝐵�∗ = 1 − 𝜋𝜋∗
𝜋𝜋∗
𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗. (4) 
 
PROPOSITION 2 OF BETT: Suppose the markup projection (4) holds.  When merger 
negotiations force rational bidders to raise the offer price with the runup (costly feedback loop), 
the markup becomes a positive and monotonic function of the runup, and the linear markup 
regression (2) yields a positive slope coefficient (𝑏𝑏 > 0). 
 
3. The Relationship between the Rates of Runup and Markup 
BETT’s theoretical model of takeover and its predictions are developed in terms of dollar 
values, whereas the corresponding empirical analysis is based on the rates of runup and markup.  
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To examine the implications and relevance of their empirical analysis, we need a theory and 
predictions based on markup and runup rates.   
 
3.1. The Baseline Model  
This subsection presents the rate-version of theoretical predictions about the effects of 
runup on markup, under the rational deal anticipation.  Corresponding to Proposition 1 of BETT, 
we first demonstrate the following proposition.  
 
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose the markup projection (3) holds and the takeover signal causes the 
market to infer different takeover probabilities and conditional deal values (𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 > 0⁄  and 
𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 > 0⁄ ).  Then, the change in markup rate with respect to the change in runup rate, 
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀/𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, is  
(i) strictly greater than −1 if the takeover probability is greater than or equal to 50% 
(𝜋𝜋 ≥ 1
2
);  
(ii) strictly greater than −1
4𝜋𝜋(1−𝜋𝜋) if the takeover probability is smaller than 50% (𝜋𝜋 < 12); 
(iii) strictly smaller than (1−𝜋𝜋)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼2
𝜋𝜋(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)2 < 1−𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋  . 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 1 implies that the slope of linear regression (1) for the rate of markup against 
the rate of runup has a lower bound of −1 only if all takeover bids are more likely to occur (i.e., 
probability 𝜋𝜋 ≥ 1/2).  This result is parallel to Proposition 1 of BETT for the regression of 
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅.  BETT’s empirical analysis was undertaken for the rates of markup and 
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runup (see Tables III and IV in BETT), hence their empirical results are consistent with 
Proposition 1.  However, because −1
4𝜋𝜋(1−𝜋𝜋) < −1, Proposition 1 also implies that the slope of 
linear regression 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 = 𝑎𝑎� + 𝑏𝑏�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 can be less than −1 if there is a substantial portion of 
observations with 𝜋𝜋 < 1/2 in the sample.  The regression results reported in Table IV of BETT 
show that 𝑏𝑏� > −1,3 which implies that the market on average expects that the takeover deal is 
more likely to occur if the hypothesis of rational deal anticipation is true.  
 Result (iii) in Proposition 1 imposes an upper bound for the derivative 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀/𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅.  At the 
extreme, if the initial value of the target 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 is very small relative to its value after runup, 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅, 
and/or if the market considers the takeover bid extremely likely to occur (i.e., 𝜋𝜋 is close to 1), 
then the upper bound (1−𝜋𝜋)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼2
𝜋𝜋(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)2 approaches zero (see Figure 2 below for illustration).  In other 
words, the slope coefficient 𝑏𝑏� of regression (1) is most likely to be negative in this case. 
Throughout the paper, BETT uses the example of uniformly distributed synergy 𝑆𝑆 
extensively to illustrate the insights and implications of the theoretical model.  Following BETT, 
we consider 𝐺𝐺(𝑆𝑆|𝑠𝑠)~𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠 − ∆, 𝑠𝑠 + ∆) and 𝑔𝑔(𝑆𝑆|𝑠𝑠) = 1/2∆.  Applying the values of 𝜋𝜋, 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅, 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃, 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  
and 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
 given in BETT’s Appendix, we can easily show that when 𝑠𝑠 − ∆< 𝐾𝐾 < 𝑠𝑠 + ∆, there is  
 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
= − 4𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)(𝑠𝑠 + ∆ + 𝐾𝐾)24(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)2(𝑠𝑠 + ∆) 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 . (5) 
This leads us to the following corollary. 
 
                                                          
3 The only exception is model (2), which returns an estimate 𝑏𝑏� equal to −1.01.  Although the estimate of −1.01 is 
insignificantly different from −1, BETT takes it as potential violation to their theoretical predictions and attributes 
the excess of −1 as the result of runup adjustment.   
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COROLLARY 1: Suppose the markup projection (3) holds and synergy 𝑆𝑆 is uniformly 
distributed on (𝑠𝑠 − ∆, 𝑠𝑠 + ∆).  If the bidding cost is in a reasonable range that 𝑠𝑠 − ∆< 𝐾𝐾 < 𝑠𝑠 +
∆, then 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 satisfies (5).   
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
Obviously, the corollary indicates that the slope of linear regression 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 = 𝑎𝑎� + 𝑏𝑏�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is 
negative if all of the takeover signals are positive.  This property of 𝑏𝑏� is qualitatively similar to 
the slope of 𝑏𝑏 in the regression of dollar-value markup and runup.  However, (5) predicts that the 
relationship between the rate of markup and the rate of runup depends on the size of the target’s 
stand-alone value.  For example, 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 tends to zero when 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 tends to zero.  
Panel A of Figure 2 illustrates derivative 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 against the increase in the takeover signal 𝑠𝑠 
received by the market, as specified by (5).  Apparently, the relationship between 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is 
highly nonlinear.  The derivative declines sharply in the negative territory of 𝑠𝑠 and reaches a 
minimum below zero.  Then, it gradually increases and moves toward zero.  Intuitively, when the 
signal is very low and negative, the market does not really expect that the potential bidding firm 
will eventually offer to buy the target (i.e., 𝜋𝜋 is close to zero).  Therefore, a marginal 
improvement in signal 𝑠𝑠 triggers a moderate runup but a profound announcement surprise if the 
takeover offer is eventually announced.  This effect is reflected by the high upper bound 1−𝜋𝜋
𝜋𝜋
 and 
the large derivative 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
.  With the rise of signal 𝑠𝑠, the market expectation of takeover probability 
increases substantially and the marginal effect of signal on runup rate is intensified, but the effect 
on announcement surprise is weakened, which leads 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 to fall steeply.  At 𝑠𝑠 = −0.048, 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
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reaches its minimum of −0.342.  After this minimum point, a stronger signal has a greater effect 
on the market interpretation of conditional deal value.  Therefore, a large signal induces a greater 
markup rate than runup rate, resulting in an increasing 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
.   
Figure 2 here 
 
3.2. The Markup Accommodating a Costly Feedback Loop 
With a costly feedback loop, the rate of markup is  
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
∗ = 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃∗ − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ = 𝐵𝐵�∗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗, 
and 
 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀∗
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗ = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗)2 ��𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵�∗𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠� � (𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗) − 𝐵𝐵�∗�. (6) 
However, reorganizing Eq (15) in BETT yields 
𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵�∗
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
� = 1 − 𝜋𝜋∗
𝜋𝜋∗
�1 + 𝐵𝐵�∗𝑔𝑔(𝐾𝐾∗)
𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜋𝜋∗)2 − 𝐵𝐵�∗Υ(1 − 𝜋𝜋∗)2�, 
where Υ ≡ �𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
�
−1
∫ 𝑔𝑔′(𝑆𝑆|𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆∞𝐾𝐾∗ .  Substituting the above equation into (6) and noting 𝐵𝐵�∗ =
1−𝜋𝜋∗
𝜋𝜋∗
𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗, we have 
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
∗
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗ = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼(1 − 𝜋𝜋∗)(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗)2𝜋𝜋∗ �(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗)�1 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗𝑔𝑔(𝐾𝐾∗)𝜃𝜃𝜋𝜋∗(1 − 𝜋𝜋∗) − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗Υ𝜋𝜋∗(1 − 𝜋𝜋∗)� − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗�. 
Hence, 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
∗
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗ < 0 if and only if 
 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗
𝜋𝜋∗(1 − 𝜋𝜋∗)�Υ − 𝑔𝑔(𝐾𝐾∗)𝜃𝜃 � > 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗. (7) 
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Since the right side of (7) is positive, a necessary condition for (7) to be true is that Υ >
𝑔𝑔(𝐾𝐾∗) 𝜃𝜃⁄ .  Noting that Υ is inversely related to 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
, we find that the inequality is more likely to 
hold if dollar-value runup is less sensitive to takeover rumor.  Given Υ > 𝑔𝑔(𝐾𝐾∗) 𝜃𝜃⁄ , we can see 
from (7) that it is more likely to hold if the stand-alone value of the target is relatively smaller 
than the runup.  In general, the model cannot rule out the possibility of the relationship between 
the rates of markup and runup being positive or negative without further specifications.  This is 
in sharp contrast to the monotonic and positive relationship between markup and runup in dollar 
terms, as predicted by Proposition 2 of BETT.  
 
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose the markup projection (4) holds.  When merger negotiations force 
rational bidders to raise the offer price with the runup (costly feedback loop), the rate of markup 
can be either positively or negatively related to the rate of runup, and the slope coefficient in the 
linear regression 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝑎𝑎� + 𝑏𝑏�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  can be either positive or negative.  
 
Propositions 1 and 2 have an important implication for empirical analysis.  They state 
that the slope coefficient in the linear regression of the rate of markup over the rate of runup can 
be either positive or negative under both hypotheses of rational deal anticipation and a costly 
feedback loop.  Therefore, it is impossible to use the sign of the slope coefficient of (1) to 
support or reject either hypothesis.   
To have a closer look on condition (7), we now consider again that synergy 𝑆𝑆 is 
uniformly distributed, i.e., 𝐺𝐺(𝑆𝑆|𝑠𝑠)~𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠 − ∆, 𝑠𝑠 + ∆).  Since 𝜋𝜋∗ = 1 if 𝐾𝐾∗ < 𝑠𝑠 − ∆ and 𝜋𝜋∗ = 0 if 
𝐾𝐾∗ > 𝑠𝑠 + ∆, we assume a market with 𝐾𝐾∗ − ∆< 𝑠𝑠 < 𝐾𝐾∗ + ∆ to avoid the trivial cases.  With this 
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specification, we can obtain closed-form solutions to all of the variables and, in turn, attain the 
following corollary.  
 
COROLLARY 2: Suppose the markup projection (4) holds and takeover synergy 𝑆𝑆 is uniformly 
distributed on (𝑠𝑠 − ∆, 𝑠𝑠 + ∆).  When a costly feedback loop prevails in the takeover market,  
(i) the derivative 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
∗
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗  is negative if and only if 
 4Δ2θ2𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗[𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ + 2Δθ2 + 𝐶𝐶 − (𝑠𝑠 + Δ)θ2][(𝑠𝑠 + Δ)θ − 𝐶𝐶 − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗][(Δ − s)θ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗][𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)(𝑠𝑠 + Δ)] > 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗, (8) 
where 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ is determined by  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗ = �[(Δ−s)θ2+𝐶𝐶]2+(1−𝜃𝜃2)[(𝑑𝑑+Δ)2θ2−𝐶𝐶2]−�(Δ−s)θ2+𝐶𝐶�(1+𝜃𝜃) ;  (9) 
(ii) the derivative 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
∗
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗  is strictly greater than 
𝜋𝜋∗−1
4𝜋𝜋∗
 but smaller than  𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼2(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ )2 1−𝜋𝜋∗𝜋𝜋∗ < 1−𝜋𝜋∗𝜋𝜋∗ . 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
 
The corollary confirms the results in Proposition 2 that the takeover model of BETT does 
not rule out the possibility that the slope coefficient of linear regression 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝑎𝑎� + 𝑏𝑏�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  could be 
either positive or negative under the hypothesis of a costly feedback loop.  Panel B in Figure 2 
illustrates this possibility and it is obvious that the curve of 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
∗
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗  in the panel is stunningly similar 
to the curve of 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 in Panel A of Figure 2.  This similarity between the two paradigms implies 
that it is extremely difficult to separate the two hypotheses by the slope coefficient of the linear 
regression of the rate of markup on the rate of runup. 
It is interesting to note that the upper bound for the case of a costly feedback loop in 
Corollary 2 has the same functional form as that of the baseline model in Proposition 1.  
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Moreover, although the lower bound 𝜋𝜋
∗−1
4𝜋𝜋∗
 in Corollary 2 requires the assumption of a uniform 
distribution of synergy 𝑆𝑆, the upper bound of 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
2
�𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗�
2
1−𝜋𝜋∗
𝜋𝜋∗
 does not rely on this assumption.  As 
the proof of Corollary 2 shows, it holds as long as the probability of a bid occurring 𝜋𝜋∗ increases 
in signal 𝑠𝑠.4 
 
4. Can the Hypothesis of a Costly Feedback Loop Be Rejected? 
As we have seen, the theoretical model developed in Section 3 does not directly present 
unambiguous predictions of the relationship between the rates of runup and markup for the 
empirical tests of rational deal anticipation vs. a costly feedback loop in the takeover markets.  
However, the model’s predictions based on dollar-value runup and markup are less ambiguous.  
The problem of regressing dollar-value markup against dollar-value runup in cross-sectional 
analysis is that markup and runup vary substantially in cross-section, which may invalidate the 
regression.  To overcome this difficulty, we propose using standardized runup and markup; that 
is, each target firm’s runup and markup are scaled by its initial value.  More specifically, we 
define standardized runup and takeover premium as 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 ≡
𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
 and 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃 ≡
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
.  Thus, the 
standardized markup is 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃 −𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅.  As the initial value 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 is independent of the takeover signal 𝑠𝑠, 
we have 𝑑𝑑(𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃−𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑(𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃−𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
 and 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
.  Therefore, 𝑑𝑑(𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃−𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)
𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
= 𝑑𝑑(𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃−𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅)
𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅
 and BETT’s 
Propositions 1 and 2 hold for the standardized runup and markup.  This section uses (2a) below 
to undertake empirical analysis and investigate further whether the hypothesis of a costly 
feedback loop can be rejected:   
                                                          
4 The assumption of uniformly distributed 𝑆𝑆 conditional on signal 𝑠𝑠 ensures that 𝜋𝜋∗ increases in 𝑠𝑠.  
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 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃 −𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 , (2a) 
To facilitate the comparison of our results with those of BETT, we adopt the sample 
selection criteria set by BETT to select the sample.  The initial control bids are collected from 
SDC Platinum of Thomson Reuters with the following criteria: the transaction form should be 
“merger” or “acquisition of majority interest”, the target company must be publicly listed and 
U.S. domiciled, and the acquirer company should own less than 50% of the target shares prior to 
the merger and acquisition and seek to own at least 50% of the target shares.  Following BETT, 
we further require that the targets should be listed on NYSE, Amex or NASDAQ; have at least 
100 days of common stock return data from CRSP over the estimation period; have a total 
market capitalization exceeding $10 million on day −42;5 have a stock price greater than $1 on 
day −42; have an offer price in the SDC database; have stock price information in CRSP on day 
−2; have an announcement return for the window [−1, +1]; have information on the outcome 
and ending date of the contest; and have a contest length of less than or equal to 252 trading days 
(one year).  Similar to BETT, we drop the subsequent control bids within six months of an 
earliest control bid.  BETT’s sample period is from January 1980 to December 2008, and we 
extend it to December 2013.  To ensure that our empirical findings are not sensitive to the 
sample period selection, the results from both sample periods are reported.  The final sample has 
6953 control contests.  Table I reports the annual distributions of the rate of offer premium, the 
rate of markup, the rate of runup (which is equal to the standardized runup) and the standardized 
markup.  The standard deviations of these variables are also reported at the bottom of the table. 
Table I here 
                                                          
5 Event day, i.e., takeover offer announcement day, is defined as day zero. 
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We use three sets of variables to proxy scaled dollar-value markup and runup.  First, we 
set 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃 −𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 = 𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃−𝑃𝑃−2𝑃𝑃−42  and 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃−2𝑃𝑃−42 − 1, where 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 is the price per share offered by the initial 
bidder and 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 is the target’s stock price on day 𝑡𝑡 relative to the takeover announcement day 
(𝑡𝑡 = 0).  In the second set, we consider takeover markup over three days around takeover 
announcement, and therefore 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃 −𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃1−𝑃𝑃−2𝑃𝑃−42  and 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃−2𝑃𝑃−42 − 1.   
In these two sets of variables, the effect of systematic risk has not been eliminated.  To 
adjust for systematic risk, let us consider the rate of abnormal return 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 on day 
𝑡𝑡, where 𝛽𝛽 is the market beta of the target firm and 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 is market return on day 𝑡𝑡.  If there are 𝑁𝑁 
shares outstanding, the abnormal increase of the target value on day 𝑡𝑡, in dollar terms, is 
𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁(𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 − 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1).  Since the abnormal increase in a period is the sum 
of 𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 over the period, the adjusted-runup can be defined as the abnormal increase of the target 
value in the runup period adjusted by systematic risk, i.e., 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 = 𝑁𝑁(𝑂𝑂−2 − 𝑂𝑂−42) −
𝑁𝑁𝛽𝛽∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1
𝑡𝑡=−2
𝑡𝑡=−41 .  Similarly, the adjusted-markup is 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁(𝑂𝑂1 − 𝑂𝑂−2) − 𝑁𝑁𝛽𝛽∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1𝑡𝑡=1𝑡𝑡=−1 .  
Scaling them by the target’s value on the initial day, 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂−42, we have the standardized adjusted-
runup 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 = 𝑂𝑂−2 − 𝑂𝑂−42𝑂𝑂−42 − 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂−42 � 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1𝑡𝑡=−2
𝑡𝑡=−41
, 
and the standardized adjusted-markup  
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 = 𝑂𝑂1 − 𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42 − 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂−42 � 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1𝑡𝑡=1
𝑡𝑡=−1
. 
Therefore, the third set of variables are 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃 −𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 = 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 and 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 = 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅.   
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The regression outcomes of these three sets of variables are documented in the left panel 
of Table II, in which a regression analysis of (2a) is performed based on each set of variables for 
both 1980-2008 and 1980-2013 sample periods.  Obviously, all of the slope coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant.6  Because supporting the hypothesis of rational deal 
anticipation and at the same time rejecting that of a costly feedback loop require a significant 
slope coefficient between minus one and zero, the empirical results in the left panel of Table II 
do not provide evidence in favor of rational deal anticipation in the market for corporate control.  
On the other hand, the right panel of Table II shows that the slope coefficients of linear 
regression (1) of the rate of markup on the rate of runup are between minus one and zero and 
significant, which are consistent with the results reported in Table IV of BETT for similar 
regressions.  This sharp contrast of the slope coefficients between the pairs of regressions in the 
left and right panels of Table II demonstrates that extra caution should be exerted when applying 
outcomes from the regression model of the rates of variables to the analysis of theoretical 
predications based on their counterparts in dollar-terms.  
Table II here 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In contrast to BETT’s claim, this paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence 
showing that both hypotheses of rational deal anticipation and a costly feedback loop cannot be 
rejected.  On the theoretical front, we demonstrate that the relationship between the rates of 
markup and runup can be negative under both hypotheses, which contradicts the theoretical 
                                                          
6 Noting that the residuals in (2a) are likely to be heteroscedastic, we also use heteroscedasticity-consistent t-
statistics to examine the significance of the slope coefficient and the results are qualitatively indifferent.  
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prediction of the monotonic and positive relationship between dollar-value markup and runup 
under a costly feedback loop hypothesis.  On the empirical analysis side, we document that the 
slope coefficient of the linear regression of standardized markup and runup is (significantly) 
positive, which is consistent with both hypotheses of rational deal anticipation and a costly 
feedback loop.  
More importantly, this paper advocates the importance and necessity of scrutinizing the 
implications of the regression of variables in dollar terms and that of these variables in their 
rates, if theory explores the economic mechanisms using dollar-value variables to preserve 
tractability and an empirical analysis is conducted by the rates of these variables to facilitate 
cross-sectional comparison.  Without thorough scrutiny, it is likely to run the risk of drawing 
inaccurate or even incorrect conclusions when using empirical results to support or reject the 
theoretical predictions.   
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Appendix: Proofs 
A. Proof of Proposition 1 
Taking derivative of 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 = 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃−𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅  with respective to 𝑠𝑠 and applying (3) yield  
 
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
= 𝜋𝜋(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 − (𝜋𝜋𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
𝜋𝜋(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)2 . (A1) 
Substituting 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 1
𝜋𝜋2
�𝜋𝜋
𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
− 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
� into it leads to  
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
= (𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅) �𝜋𝜋 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠� − 𝜋𝜋(𝜋𝜋𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
𝜋𝜋2(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)2 . 
Noting 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
> 0, we have 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 1
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
> 0.  Therefore,  
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
< (1 − 𝜋𝜋)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼2
𝜋𝜋(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)2 < 1 − 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 , 
which proves conclusion (iii) of the proposition.  On the other hand, dropping the term related to 
𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
 in (A1) results in 
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
> −𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼(𝜋𝜋𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)
𝜋𝜋(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)2 . 
It is easy to verify that when 𝜋𝜋 ≥ 1/2, 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼(𝜋𝜋𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)
𝜋𝜋(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)2  is a strictly decreasing function of 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 for any 
𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 ≥ 0, and hence it attains the maximum of 1 at 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 = 0.  If 𝜋𝜋 < 1/2, 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼(𝜋𝜋𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)𝜋𝜋(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)2  attains the 
unique global maximum of 1
4𝜋𝜋(1−𝜋𝜋) at 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 = (1 − 2𝜋𝜋)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼.  This completes the proof. 
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B. Proof of Corollary 1 
With uniformly distributed 𝑆𝑆 and non-triviality condition 𝑠𝑠 − ∆< 𝐾𝐾 < 𝑠𝑠 + ∆, BETT 
demonstrates that 𝜋𝜋 = 𝑑𝑑+∆−𝐾𝐾
2∆
, 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 = 1−𝜃𝜃4∆ [(𝑠𝑠 + ∆)2 − 𝐾𝐾2], 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 = 1−𝜃𝜃2 (𝑠𝑠 + ∆ + 𝐾𝐾), 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =
1−𝜃𝜃
2∆
(𝑠𝑠 + ∆) and 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 1−𝜃𝜃
2
.  Applying them to 𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
, we obtain 
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
= ∆ �𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 1 − 𝜃𝜃4∆ [(𝑠𝑠 + ∆)2 − 𝐾𝐾2]� − �𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 1 − 𝜃𝜃2 (𝑠𝑠 + ∆ + 𝐾𝐾)� (𝑠𝑠 + ∆)(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)2(𝑠𝑠 + ∆) 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 
= −4𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)(𝑠𝑠 + ∆ + 𝐾𝐾)24(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅)2(𝑠𝑠 + ∆) 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 . 
 
C. Proof of Corollary 2 
From the definitions, we have  
𝜋𝜋∗ = (𝑑𝑑+Δ)θ−𝐶𝐶−𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗
2Δθ
,      𝐵𝐵�∗ = 1−𝜃𝜃
2θ
[(𝑠𝑠 + Δ)θ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗]. 
Since 1 − 𝜋𝜋∗ = (Δ−s)θ+𝐶𝐶+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗
2Δθ
 and 𝐵𝐵�∗ = 1−𝜋𝜋∗
𝜋𝜋∗
𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗, there is  1 − 𝜃𝜃2θ [(𝑠𝑠 + Δ)θ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗] = (Δ − s)θ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗(𝑠𝑠 + Δ)θ − 𝐶𝐶 − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗. 
Reorganizing it yields 
 (1 + 𝜃𝜃)(𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗)2 + 2[(Δ − s)θ2 + 𝐶𝐶]𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)[(𝑠𝑠 + Δ)2θ2 − 𝐶𝐶2] = 0. (A2) 
The solution to (A2) is 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ in (9), where we have dropped the solution that leads to 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ < 0.  On 
the other hand, taking the derivative of (A2) with respect to 𝑠𝑠 yields 
 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
= θ2𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)(𝑠𝑠 + Δ)θ2(1 + 𝜃𝜃)𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ + (Δ − s)θ2 + 𝐶𝐶 > 0. (A3) 
For the uniform distribution on (𝑠𝑠 − ∆, 𝑠𝑠 + ∆), 𝑔𝑔(𝐾𝐾∗) =1/(2Δ) and ∫ 𝑔𝑔′(𝑆𝑆|𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆∞𝐾𝐾∗ =1/(2Δ).  
Applying them and 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
 in (A3) to solve for Υ in (7), we obtain (8) in the text.   
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For the lower bound in (ii), first noting that 𝐵𝐵�∗ = 1−𝜃𝜃
2θ
[(𝑠𝑠 + Δ)θ + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗], we have 
𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵�∗
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
= 1 − 𝜃𝜃2θ �θ + 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 � > 1 − 𝜃𝜃2 . 
Applying it to (6) yields  
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
∗
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗ > 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗)2 �1 − 𝜃𝜃2θ (𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗) − 1 − 𝜋𝜋∗𝜋𝜋∗ 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗�. 
Let Θ ≡ 𝜃𝜃
1−𝜃𝜃
, Π∗ ≡ 𝜋𝜋
∗
1−𝜋𝜋∗
 and 𝐽𝐽 ≡ 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
�𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗�
2 �
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗
2Θ
−
𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗
Π∗
�.  Note that  
𝜕𝜕𝐽𝐽
𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗ = −𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗)3 �� 12Θ + 1Π∗�𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼+ � 12Θ − 1Π∗�𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗�, 
and 𝜋𝜋∗ < 𝜃𝜃 as shown by BETT.  Then, we find that Π∗ < 2Θ and 𝐽𝐽 attains at 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ = 2Θ+Π∗2Θ−Π∗ 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 the 
unique global minimum of  
𝐽𝐽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = − (2Θ − Π∗)216Π∗Θ2 ≥ − 1 − 𝜋𝜋∗𝜋𝜋∗ , 
which is the lower bound given in Corollary 2.  For the upper bound in (ii), we take the 
derivative of 𝐵𝐵�∗ = 1−𝜋𝜋∗
𝜋𝜋∗
𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
∗ with respect to 𝑠𝑠 and get  
𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵�∗
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
= − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗(𝜋𝜋∗)2 𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋∗𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 + 1 − 𝜋𝜋∗𝜋𝜋∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 . 
It can be shown that 𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋
∗
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
> 0 if 𝑠𝑠 is uniformly distributed (the proof is available upon request), 
thus substituting 𝐵𝐵�∗ and 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵
�∗
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
 into (6) we obtain 
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
∗
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗ < 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ )2 �1 − 𝜋𝜋∗𝜋𝜋∗ (𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ ) − 1 − 𝜋𝜋∗𝜋𝜋∗ 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ � = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼2(𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 + 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅∗ )2 1 − 𝜋𝜋∗𝜋𝜋∗ < 1 − 𝜋𝜋∗𝜋𝜋∗ , 
which provides the upper bound in (ii).  
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Panel A: Relationship between the rates of runup and markup
 
Panel B: Relationship between the values of runup and markup
 
Figure 1. The relationship between the rates of runup and markup vs. the relationship between the values of runup and 
markup.  The data in Panel A are generated from model (1) in Table IV of BETT, such that 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 = 0.36 − 0.24𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 for 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 =0, 2%, … , 30%, which yields a positive relationship between runup and markup in dollar terms, such that 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 − 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 = 0.36336 +0.048𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 in Panel B.  The initial value of the target is set at 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 = 1. 
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Panel A: Without costly feedback loop  
 
 
 
Panel B: With costly feedback loop 
 
 
Figure 2. The change in markup rate over runup rate as the synergy signal increases.  This 
figure plots the change in markup rate over runup rate as the synergy signal increases. The 
market receives a signal 𝑠𝑠 about a potential takeover with synergy 𝑆𝑆, where 𝑆𝑆|𝑠𝑠~𝑈𝑈(𝑠𝑠 − ∆, 𝑠𝑠 + ∆) 
and ∆= 6.  The synergy sharing rule is 𝜃𝜃 = 0.5 and bid costs are 𝐶𝐶 = 0.5, 𝐾𝐾 = 𝐶𝐶/𝜃𝜃.  In the 
vertical axis, 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 or 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀∗  is the rate of markup and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 or 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  is the rate of runup.  The initial value 
of the target is 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 = 1.    
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Table I 
Annual Distributions of the Initial Offer Premium, Markup and Runup 
The upper panel of this table shows the means and medians of the rate of offer premium, the rate of markup, the rate 
of runup (which is equal to the standardized runup) and the standardized markup from 1980 through 2013, where 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 is the price per share offered by the initial bidder and 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 is the target stock price on trading day 𝑡𝑡 relative to the 
takeover announcement day (𝑡𝑡 = 0).  The lower panel reports the standard deviations of the four variables over the 
two sample periods. 
 
 
Sample 
size 
Rate of offer 
premium 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂
𝑂𝑂−42
− 1 Rate of markup 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂−2 − 1 Rate of runup  𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42 − 1 
Standardized 
markup 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 − 𝑂𝑂−2
𝑂𝑂−42
 
Year N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1980 6 0.43 0.35 0.29 0.37 0.13 0.14 0.30 0.36 
1981 39 0.54 0.45 0.39 0.33 0.11 0.07 0.43 0.33 
1982 36 0.42 0.46 0.38 0.38 0.04 0.03 0.38 0.40 
1983 45 0.40 0.40 0.27 0.23 0.10 0.09 0.29 0.27 
1984 87 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.27 0.05 0.06 0.33 0.28 
1985 135 0.38 0.35 0.26 0.22 0.09 0.11 0.28 0.24 
1986 190 0.41 0.36 0.28 0.23 0.11 0.10 0.29 0.26 
1987 228 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.26 0.05 0.06 0.29 0.28 
1988 295 0.56 0.49 0.37 0.30 0.15 0.10 0.41 0.34 
1989 198 0.44 0.39 0.32 0.27 0.10 0.06 0.34 0.29 
1990 106 0.49 0.42 0.47 0.42 0.03 -0.002 0.46 0.47 
1991 97 0.52 0.45 0.43 0.34 0.07 0.06 0.44 0.38 
1992 84 0.52 0.42 0.34 0.26 0.14 0.09 0.38 0.32 
1993 126 0.45 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.09 0.05 0.36 0.34 
1994 217 0.41 0.38 0.32 0.30 0.07 0.07 0.34 0.31 
1995 268 0.44 0.38 0.32 0.27 0.10 0.07 0.34 0.31 
1996 302 0.38 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.09 0.05 0.30 0.25 
1997 422 0.39 0.35 0.25 0.21 0.12 0.10 0.27 0.25 
1998 445 0.45 0.35 0.35 0.25 0.08 0.06 0.37 0.26 
1999 519 0.54 0.45 0.36 0.30 0.15 0.11 0.39 0.34 
2000 415 0.50 0.42 0.37 0.32 0.11 0.06 0.39 0.34 
2001 285 0.48 0.42 0.36 0.31 0.09 0.06 0.38 0.32 
2002 165 0.45 0.39 0.35 0.31 0.08 0.03 0.37 0.32 
2003 202 0.42 0.34 0.29 0.23 0.11 0.07 0.31 0.25 
2004 212 0.31 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.06 0.05 0.24 0.20 
2005 246 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.05 0.04 0.25 0.22 
2006 291 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.26 0.22 
2007 304 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.22 0.02 0.02 0.27 0.23 
2008 195 0.32 0.29 0.42 0.35 -0.06 -0.05 0.38 0.32 
2009 111 0.55 0.46 0.42 0.32 0.09 0.07 0.45 0.34 
2010 187 0.45 0.39 0.37 0.32 0.07 0.05 0.38 0.33 
2011 176 0.42 0.35 0.36 0.31 0.06 0.04 0.36 0.32 
2012 168 0.44 0.36 0.39 0.31 0.05 0.04 0.39 0.33 
2013 151 0.37 0.34 0.27 0.24 0.08 0.07 0.29 0.26 
1980-
2008 6160 0.42 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.09 0.06 0.34 0.28 
1980-
2013 6953 0.42 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.08 0.06 0.34 0.29 
St. Dev., 1980-2008 0.435 0.345 0.234 0.347 
St. Dev., 1980-2013 0.432 0.347 0.233 0.351 
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Table II 
Linear Regressions of Markup against Runup 
This table reports the regression results of markup on runup.  The focus is on the left panel, in which markup and runup are proxied by three sets of variables in 
their standardized dollar terms.  For comparison, the corresponding results of markup rate regressing on runup rate are documented in the right panel.  The 
regressions are conducted for the 1980-2008 and 1980-2013 sample periods.  In the table, 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 is the price per share offered by the initial bidder, 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 is the target 
stock price on trading day 𝑡𝑡 relative to the takeover announcement day (𝑡𝑡 = 0), 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2) is the cumulative abnormal return of target stock over 𝑡𝑡1 through 𝑡𝑡2, 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 = 𝑃𝑃1−𝑃𝑃−2𝑃𝑃−42 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃−42 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1𝑡𝑡=1𝑡𝑡=−1   is the standardized adjusted-markup and 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃−2−𝑃𝑃−42𝑃𝑃−42 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃−42 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1𝑡𝑡=−2𝑡𝑡=−41  is the standardized adjusted-runup, where 
𝛽𝛽 is the market beta of the target firm and 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 is market return on day 𝑡𝑡. 
 
 In Standardized Dollar Terms In Rate Terms 
 Markup 
𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃 −𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 
Runup 
𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 
Regression 
𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃 −𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅 Markup 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 Runup 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 Regression 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 = 𝑎𝑎� + 𝑏𝑏�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 
a. 1980-2008 
𝑁𝑁 =  6160 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 − 𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42  𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42 − 1 𝑎𝑎 =  0.32 (𝑡𝑡 =  69.19) 𝑏𝑏 =  0.12 (𝑡𝑡 =  6.49) 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂−2 − 1 𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42 − 1 𝑎𝑎 � =  0.34 (𝑡𝑡 =  73.18) 𝑏𝑏 � =  −0.22 (𝑡𝑡 =  −11.9) 
b. 1980-2013 
𝑁𝑁 =  6953 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 − 𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42  𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42 − 1 𝑎𝑎 =  0.33 (𝑡𝑡 =  74.42) 𝑏𝑏 =  0.08 (𝑡𝑡 =  4.62) 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂−2 − 1 𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42 − 1 𝑎𝑎�  =  0.34 (𝑡𝑡 =  78.91) 𝑏𝑏�  =  −0.23 (𝑡𝑡 =  −13.32) 
c. 1980-2008 
𝑁𝑁 =  6160 𝑂𝑂1 − 𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42  𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42 − 1 𝑎𝑎 =  0.21 (𝑡𝑡 =  63.56) 𝑏𝑏 =  0.06 (𝑡𝑡 =  4.38) 𝑂𝑂1𝑂𝑂−2 − 1 𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42 − 1 𝑎𝑎�  =  0.22 (𝑡𝑡 =  67.72) 𝑏𝑏�  =  −0.14 (𝑡𝑡 =  −11.1) 
d. 1980-2013 
𝑁𝑁 =  6953 𝑂𝑂1 − 𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42  𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42 − 1 𝑎𝑎 =  0.23 (𝑡𝑡 =  69.69) 𝑏𝑏 =  0.03 (𝑡𝑡 =  2.66) 𝑂𝑂1𝑂𝑂−2 − 1 𝑂𝑂−2𝑂𝑂−42 − 1 𝑎𝑎�  =  0.23 (𝑡𝑡 =  74.58) 𝑏𝑏�  =  −0.16 (𝑡𝑡 =  −12.61) 
e. 1980-2008 
𝑁𝑁 =  6160 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 𝑎𝑎 =  0.21 (𝑡𝑡 =  64.48) 𝑏𝑏 =  0.05 (𝑡𝑡 =  3.74) 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(−1,1) 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(−41,−2) 𝑎𝑎�  =  0.21 (𝑡𝑡 =  66.87) 𝑏𝑏�  =  −0.07 (𝑡𝑡 =  −5.54) 
f. 1980-2013 
𝑁𝑁 =  6953 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅 𝑎𝑎 =  0.23 (𝑡𝑡 =  70.75) 𝑏𝑏 =  0.03 (𝑡𝑡 =  1.98) 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(−1,1) 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(−41,−2) 𝑎𝑎�  =  0.22 (𝑡𝑡 =  73.74) 𝑏𝑏�  =  −0.09 (𝑡𝑡 =  −6.82) 
 
